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CASE OF MANCHEVA v. BULGARIA
(Application no. 39609/98)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 September 2004
FINAL
30/12/2004
This judgment will become final in the circumstances
set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Mancheva v. Bulgaria,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr P. Lorenzen,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mrs N. Vajic,
Mrs S. Botoucharova,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mr V. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 September 2004,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last?mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 39609/98) against
the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights
(“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian
national, Ms Minka Slavcheva Mancheva (“the applicant”), on 13 November
1997.
2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented
by Ms E. Nedeva, a lawyer practising in Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their agents, Mrs G. Samaras and
Mrs M. Dimova, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. The applicant alleged, relying on Article 6 § 1 and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that she was unable to obtain payment
from a State body of the sums awarded to her under a final judicial decision
and that Bulgarian law did not provide an efficient mechanism for the collection
of debts owed by state institutions.
4. The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November
1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5
§ 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5. The application was allocated to the First Section of the
Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the
Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention)
was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
6. By a decision of 19 December 2002, the Court declared the
application admissible. The applicant and the Government each filed observations
on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
7. On 12 February 2003 the applicant submitted an objection
challenging the representative power of the Government’s agent on the basis
of alleged deficiencies in domestic regulations. The Court rejected the
objection.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant is a Bulgarian national, who was born in 1968
and at the relevant time lived in Svoboda, the region of Haskovo.
9. The applicant used to work in the village of Svoboda, with
the Home Patronage branch of the Chirpan District Social Care Centre (Äîìàøåí
ñîöèàëåí ïàòðîíàæ, Îáùèíñêè öåíòúð çà ñîöèàëíè ãðèæè). At the relevant
time, Social Care Centres were State administrative bodies funded by the
State and municipal budgets.
10. On 3 December 1992 the applicant suffered an accident at
work. Subsequently she underwent surgical operations. She was unfit for
work for at least six months and continued experiencing health problems
for several years thereafter.
11. On 20 July 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings
against her former employer, the local Home Patronage, claiming pecuniary
and non?pecuniary damages. A representative for Home Patronage took part
in the proceedings apparently maintaining that the applicant was responsible
for the accident and that the claims were excessive.
12. On 31 March 1995 the Chirpan District Court partially granted
the applicant’s claim and awarded her 15,000 Bulgarian levs (“BGL”) in
non?pecuniary damages and BGL 4,500 in costs, plus statutory interest.
13. On 20 April 1995 the defendant, the Home Patronage, lodged
an appeal with the Stara Zagora Regional Court.
14. According to the Government, on 17 July 1995 the Social
Care Centre sent to the applicant a registered letter inviting her “to
collect BGL 15,000” but the applicant refused receipt of the letter.
15. According to the applicant, as of 30 September 1995 the
proceedings before the Regional Court were still pending.
16. On an unspecified date these proceedings ended and the District
Court’s judgment became final and enforceable.
17. Following a conversation between the applicant and employees
of the Social Care Centre, on 5 May 1996 the Social Care Centre sent to
the applicant a letter inviting her “to collect BGL 15,000”.
18. On 9 May 1996 the applicant submitted a written request
to the District Social Care Centre insisting on payment in compliance with
the District Court’s judgment, including all interest and costs. She offered
her calculation of the interest that had accrued since the relevant starting
date, 20 July 1993, and stated that the amount due was BGL 40,620.
19. The applicant, who at that time lived in another town, authorised
another person to receive the money.
20. According to “minutes”, drawn up by the accountant and two
other employees of the Social Care Centre, on 15 May 1996 they withdrew
BGL 15,000 from the Centre’s bank account but the applicant’s representative
refused to accept the money.
21. On 3 June 1996 the Social Care Centre wrote to the applicant
stating that they “wished to pay the damage sustained, in the amount of
BGL 15,000”, and invited her to visit the Centre for that purpose
on 7 June 1996. The letter also stated that the Centre was “free from any
obligation to pay interest on the amount since the date of the conversation
with [the applicant] held in the presence of [the Centre’s] employees”.
22. On 6 June 1996, upon the applicant’s request, the Chirpan
District Court issued a writ of execution ordering the Home Patronage to
pay to the applicant BGL 15,000 principal, BGL 4,500 in costs, and interest
as from 20 July 1993.
23. On 6 June 1996 the applicant submitted a request to the
competent enforcement judge seeking the institution of enforcement proceedings.
That was refused and the applicant was informed, upon her complaints to
the enforcement judge, the Regional Court and the Ministry of Justice,
that under Article 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure execution of judgments
against state bodies was only possible through submission of the writ of
execution directly to the state organ concerned. Enforcement proceedings
were not provided for. An attachment of the defendant’s bank account was
not possible.
24. The applicant was also informed that the refusal to execute
a final judgment could be a punishable criminal offence.
25. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Ministry
of Labour and Social Care, which invited the mayor of the Chirpan municipality
to comment.
26. On 15 October 1996 the mayor wrote the following to the
Ministry and to the applicant:
“Having studied the [applicant’s] request and having discussed the matter
with the management of the municipal Social Care Centre, we reached the
conclusion that the problem is under the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities.
The municipal Social Care Centre considers that the civil proceedings had
been handled wrongly: the [defendant] had been Home Patronage, which has
no legal personality and does not have its own bank account. For this reason,
the Social Care Centre sees no legal grounds, for purposes of the financial
authorities, to effect the payment. Apparently the matter should be examined
additionally by the courts. The municipal administration cannot interfere
in this matter.”
27. In 1996 the applicant submitted a complaint to the prosecution
authorities requesting the punishment of those responsible for the failure
to enforce the judicial award.
28. In April or May 1997 she complained of the inactivity of
the prosecution authorities.
29. On 19 May 1998 a prosecutor requested information from the
Social Care Centre. On 29 May 1998 the Centre replied to the prosecutor,
with a copy to the mayor of Chirpan. It stated that Home Patronage was
not a separate legal person but formed a part of the Social Care Centre
which, in turn, was under the administration and budgetary control of the
municipality. Therefore, the applicant could obtain payment by submitting
her documents to the municipality of Chirpan. The date on which that information
was transmitted to the applicant is unclear.
30. On 6 April 1999 the applicant was heard by a prosecutor.
31. On 17 March 2000 the prosecutor terminated the inquiry noting
that the applicant had been informed that she had to submit her writ of
execution and a copy of the judgment to the municipality of Chirpan.
32. During the relevant period inflation in Bulgaria was running
high and the national currency was depreciating. In particular, on 31 March
1995, the date on which the District Court’s judgment was delivered, BGL
66 were necessary to buy one United States dollar (USD), in May 1996, at
the time of the applicant’s attempts to obtain payment, that figure was
BGL 92, on 15 October 1996, the date on which the mayor refused to execute
the judgment, it was BGL 216 and in May 1998 the exchange rate was BGL 1,782
for USD 1.
33. As of 1 July 1999, BGL 1,000 became 1 new Bulgarian lev
(BGN). On 17 March 2000, the date on which the applicant was invited to
renew her request for payment before the Chirpan municipality, USD 1 was
exchangeable for BGN 1.62 (i.e., for BGL 1,620).
34. For the period May 1996 – March 2000 the statutory interest
rate in Bulgaria varied significantly, reaching during a period of several
months in the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 an average of approximately
200% per annum. That was however insufficient to compensate for the loss
of value of the Bulgarian lev during that period.
35. Following the admissibility decision in the present case,
on 21 February 2003 the municipality of Chirpan paid BGN 68.69 into
a bank account opened by them in the applicant’s name. The amount included
BGN 15 in principal, BGN 49.19 in interest for the period 20 July
1993 – 20 February 2003 and BGN 4.50 in costs. The applicant was informed
by letter.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Enforcement against state institutions under the Code of
Civil Procedure
36. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 399, a person
who has an enforceable pecuniary claim against the State or a state body
shall receive payment out of funds allocated for that purpose under the
institution’s budget.
37. The writ of execution shall be submitted to the financial
department of the institution. If there are no funds available under the
budget of the state body concerned, the higher administrative organ should
undertake the necessary steps to ensure that funds become available under
the budget for the following year.
38. Enforcement proceedings and judicial review of the execution
of a judgment are not possible where the debtor is a state institution.
Until December 1997 paragraph 1 of Article 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure
expressly prohibited enforcement proceedings against state institution.
Although that provision was repealed in December 1997, the legal regime
remained unchanged, as paragraph 2 of Article 399 was not amended.
B. Other relevant law
39. According to Articles 246 and 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
a writ of execution is issued in a single copy which must be produced for
execution. Where the original has been lost, a duplicata may be
issued in special proceedings which require summoning the debtor at an
oral hearing.
40. According to section 66 of the Obligations and Contracts
Act, a creditor is entitled to refuse partial payment.
41. According to section 97 of the Obligations and Contracts
Act, if the creditor fails to undertake the measures necessary to receive
payment, the debtor may discharge a pecuniary debt by depositing the money
in a bank account.
THE LAW
42. The applicant complained that she was unable to obtain payment
of the sums owed to her by a State body under a final judicial decision
and that Bulgarian law did not provide an efficient mechanism for the collection
of debts owed by state institutions.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
43. Article 6 § 1 provides, as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone
is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal
...”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicant
44. The applicant contended that the events complained of had
been the result solely of the unwillingness of Home Patronage and the Social
Care Centre to pay. It was not true, as stated by the Government, that
the partial payment offer had been motivated by budgetary constraints.
In reality, there had been a clear attempt on the part of the municipal
authorities to avoid full payment. That was illustrated by the correspondence
of May and June 1996.
45. Moreover, in flagrant disregard of the rule of law, in his
letter of 15 October 1996 the mayor had expressly stated his refusal
to enforce a final and binding judicial decision. The applicant’s ensuing
attempts to secure compliance by seeking criminal proceedings against the
officials obstructing the execution of the judgment had remained fruitless.
46. In the light of these facts, it was obvious that the applicant’s
failure to produce the original copy of the writ of execution had been
immaterial. She had submitted written claims asking to be paid in compliance
with the final judgment and had been faced with obstruction. The production
of the writ was a mere formality: it was clear that in law and in practice
the municipality could have paid without it or requested its production.
47. The applicant also submitted that the municipality could
have discharged their debt by depositing the money in a bank account, as
provided for under the Obligations and Contracts Act.
48. Further, the applicant considered that Article 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure was a remnant from the totalitarian principle of
supremacy of state interests over individual rights. It was contrary to
the new Bulgarian Constitution and the Convention, as it violated the principle
of equality of the parties to civil proceedings and left the execution
of final judgments against state institutions to the debtor’s discretion.
In the applicant’s view, there has therefore been a violation of the State’s
positive obligations to enact such procedure for the collection of debts
owed by state institutions so as to ensure respect for the individual’s
rights of enforcement of final judgments and peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
49. Finally, the applicant contended that the payment made on
21 February 2003 was insufficient as the interest accrued had been
miscalculated and in view of the fact that the amount paid did not include
a compensation for the lost value of her claim.
2. The Government
50. The Government stated that the applicant alone was responsible
for the events she complained of. In particular, she had been invited at
least three times to receive a partial payment but had refused. Had she
accepted, she would have diminished the damage caused by the inflation.
In the Government’s view, Bulgarian law did not oblige state institutions
to pay immediately and in one instalment. That was the consequence of the
specific role of state institutions. In particular, health care, education
and welfare aid depended on municipalities’ budgets. To safeguard their
proper operation, the law provided that state institutions lacking the
funds necessary to pay a debt immediately should secure resources through
the following year’s budget. Thus, the applicant had been offered an amount
corresponding to the budgetary availability. She would not have forfeited
her right to receive the remainder by accepting partial payment.
51. Further, the applicant had not submitted the original copy
of her writ of execution to the Social Care Centre or the financial department
of the municipality of Chirpan. Had she done so, she would have received
payment. The applicable procedure was repeatedly explained to her but she
did not make use of it. As of March 2001 the applicant had still not presented
her writ of execution and the municipal employees were even unaware of
her claims. By contrast, when presented with a writ of execution in another
case in January 2000, Chirpan municipality had paid without delay.
52. The Government also stated that the provisions of the Obligations
and Contracts Act, according to which a debtor may discharge a debt without
the creditor’s consent by depositing the money in a bank account, were
inapplicable: the pertinent legal regime was that under Article 399 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
53. The Government further stressed that in February 2003 the
applicant had received full payment.
B. The Court’s assessment
54. The Court reiterates that the right to access to a court,
entrenched in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, would be illusory if a
Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial
decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. Execution
of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral
part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6. The rule of law, one
of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all
Articles of the Convention and entails a duty on the part of the State
and any public authority to comply with judicial orders or decisions against
it (see the Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, pp. 510-11, §§ 40-41, Iatridis
v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II and, mutatis
mutandis, Hasan and Chaus v. Bulgaria [GC], no.
30985/96, § 87, ECHR 2000-XI).
55. Insofar as the Government may be understood as arguing that
the applicant has ceased to be a victim of the alleged violations of the
Convention by virtue of the fact that BGN 68.69 were paid to her in February
2003, the Court finds that the applicant may still claim to be a victim
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention since the payment intervened
only after the present application had been declared admissible, did not
involve any acknowledgment of the violations alleged and did not afford
the applicant adequate redress for the delay in payment (see Burdov
v. Russia, no. 59498/00, §§ 29-32, ECHR 2001-VI).
56. The parties are in dispute as to whether the applicant’s
behaviour or the conduct of the municipal authorities (the debtor) were
the principal cause for the delay in the execution of the Chirpan District
Court’s judgment of 31 March 1995.
57. The Court notes that the date on which the judgment became
final and enforceable and the date on which the applicant first sought
payment have not been established. It is undisputed, however, that on 9
May 1996 the applicant submitted a written request for payment and that
at that time the District Court’s judgment was final and enforceable (see
paragraphs 12?18 above). The Court will therefore examine the events
after that date.
58. It observes that in May and June 1996 the Social Care Centre,
the debtor, stated that they would only pay the applicant BGL 15,000 whereas
at that time the amount due, including costs and interest, had been approximately
BGL 40,000. The Centre provided no reason for not paying the whole amount
due and gave no indication of a possible date for the payment of the remainder.
It did not invoke a temporary budgetary constraint (see paragraphs 14-21
above). In any event, it is not open to a State authority to cite lack
of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt (see Burdov
v. Russia, cited above, § 35).
59. Moreover, in October 1996, in reply to the applicant’s complaints,
the mayor made an express refusal to pay, stating that the judicial proceedings
had been “wrongly handled”. The fact that the applicant had not enclosed
a writ of execution to her payment request was never cited by the municipal
authorities as grounds for their failure to pay. There is no reason to
believe that she would have refused to submit it had the municipality offered
full payment (see paragraphs 14-30 above). The applicant was, furthermore,
under no obligation to accept a partial payment. Since Bulgarian law does
not provide for judicial or other institutionalised supervision on the
execution of judgments against State institutions, the applicant could
do nothing more than to submit complaints to the prosecution authorities
and to the relevant Ministry (see paragraphs 23-25, 27-30 and 36-38 above).
60. The Court thus finds that the fact that no payment was effected
as due in 1996 was imputable to the authorities. The problems encountered
by the applicant were exacerbated by the fact that Bulgarian law does not
provide for any clearly regulated complaints procedure before an independent
body with power to issue binding orders in cases of failure of State institutions
to execute judgments against them.
61. No change in the relevant circumstances occurred until March
2000. As a result, for years the applicant was deprived of the sums owed
to her under a final and enforceable judicial decision. By failing to take
the necessary measures to comply with the final judicial decision in the
present case for the period May 1996 – March 2000 the Bulgarian authorities
deprived the provision of Article 6 § 1 of all useful effect.
62. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention in this respect.
63. As to the delay after 17 March 2000, the date on which the
applicant’s complaints resulted in a formal decision by a prosecutor who
stated that the applicant would receive payment upon submission of a request
to the Chirpan municipality, the Court observes that the applicant has
not shown valid reasons for failing to act upon this clear invitation to
renew her payment request before the competent institution. The responsibility
of the authorities cannot be engaged in respect of the period after March
2000.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE
CONVENTION
64. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides, as relevant:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and
by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
65. In accordance with the Court’s established case-law, the
applicant’s enforceable claim under the final judgment of 31 March 1995
constituted a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention.
66. The impossibility for the applicant to obtain the execution
of that judgment, until 17 March 2000, constituted an interference with
her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, as set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
67. The Government have not advanced any justification for this
interference
68. It follows that there has also been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
69. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting
Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall,
if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary damage
70. The applicant stated that at the moment of her accident,
on 3 December 1992, the amounts she was eventually awarded, BGL 19,500,
were the equivalent of approximately USD 780. She further claimed that
interest should be added to that amount and, without clarifying her method
of calculating it, sought EUR 2,000 in respect of pecuniary damage.
71. The Government stated that in February 2003 the applicant
had received full payment, including all interest. The interest compensated
her for the delay in payment. While it was true that the inflation and
the depreciation of the national currency had diminished the real value
of the amount paid to the applicant, the Government considered that they
should not be held responsible for the consequences of those economic phenomena.
In any event, if the applicant considered that she had suffered pecuniary
damage exceeding the amount received, it was open to her to bring an action
under Section 86 of the Obligations and Contracts Act.
72. The Court reiterates that Article 41 of the Convention does
not require applicants to exhaust domestic remedies a second time in order
to obtain just satisfaction if they have already done so in vain in respect
of their substantive complaints (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria,
no. 38361/97, § 172, ECHR 2002-IV).
73. The Court found that the authorities were responsible for
the fact that between May 1996 and March 2000 the applicant could not obtain
the execution of the Chirpan District Court’s judgment which awarded to
her BGL 15,000 in principal and BGL 4,500 costs, plus interest for the
period from 20 July 1993 until the date of payment (see paragraphs 12,
22 and 60?62 above). By the time the applicant was invited to renew her
payment request on 17 March 2000, the real value of the amount she was
entitled to, including statutory interest, had diminished by a factor of
fifteen or more, owing to the inflation and the depreciation of the Bulgarian
lev at the time (see paragraphs 32-35 above). The applicant thus suffered
a pecuniary loss which would have been avoided had the authorities acted
in compliance with their obligations under Article 6 § 1 and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to comply with the Chirpan District
Court’s judgment (see, as a recent authority, Metaxas v. Greece,
no. 8415/02, § 36, 27 May 2004).
74. Taking into account the available information about the
loss of value of the Bulgarian currency at the relevant time, the Court,
deciding on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 500 in respect
of pecuniary damage.
2. Non-pecuniary damage
75. The applicant also claimed EUR 6,000 in non-pecuniary damages
stating that throughout the relevant period she had suffered the medical
consequences of her accident and had needed medicines. She had also endured
frustration and humiliation caused by the attitude of the authorities who
refused to enforce the final judgment in her case.
76. The Government stated that the applicant was not subjected
to any humiliation and that she had repeatedly been invited to receive
payment. In their view the finding of a violation of the Convention constituted
sufficient just satisfaction.
77. The Court observes that there is no causal link between
the medical consequences of the accident the applicant had suffered and
the violations of the Convention found in the present case. As to the frustration
that the applicant must have endured as a result of the violations of her
Convention rights, the Court, deciding on an equitable basis and having
regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, awards EUR
500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
78. The applicant claimed EUR 3,065 for 48 hours and 30 minutes
of legal work by her lawyer on the proceedings before the Court at hourly
rates varying between EUR 50 and EUR 70. The applicant submitted a fees
agreement between her and her lawyer and a time-sheet. She also claimed
EUR 297 for translation, telephone, photocopying and overhead expenses.
She submitted postal receipts and a receipt for BGN 240 (the equivalent
of approximately EUR 120) paid for translation.
79. The Government replied that the claims were excessive in
view of the low level of the minimum monthly wages in Bulgaria. Even if
some law firms in Bulgaria charged at hourly rates comparable to those
claimed in the present case, that practice only concerned corporate clients.
The applicant’s claim was even “immoral”.
80. Deciding on an equitable basis and taking into account EUR
630 received in legal aid from the Council of Europe, the Court awards
EUR 1,800 in respect of costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
81. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according
to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary and
non?pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,800 (one thousand and eight hundred euros) in respect
of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months
until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts
at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 September 2004, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Soren Nielsen
Christos Rozakis
Registrar
President
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