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CASE OF KIURKCHIAN v. BULGARIA
(Application no. 44626/98)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24 March 2005
FINAL
24/06/2005
This judgment will become final in the circumstances
set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject
to editorial revision.
In the case of Kiurkchian v. Bulgaria,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mrs S. Botoucharova,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 March 2005,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 44626/98) against
the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights
(“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Onnik
Arshavir Kiurkchian and Mrs Nuritza Haik Kiurkchian, Bulgarian nationals
who were born in 1937 and 1947 respectively and live in Plovdiv (“the applicants”),
on 9 July 1998.
2. The applicants, who were granted legal aid, were represented
before the Court initially by Mr K. Petrov, a lawyer practising
in Sofia, and as from 9 April 2001 by Mr M. Ekimdjiev, a lawyer
practising in Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agents, Ms M. Pasheva and Ms M. Dimova,
of the Ministry of Justice.
3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the proceedings
they had issued against the municipality and against their neighbours had
lasted unreasonably long and that the excessive length of the proceedings
had allowed their neighbours to finish the construction of a building which
prevented the access of sunlight to their house.
4. The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November
1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5
§ 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5. The application was allocated to the First Section of the
Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section,
the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention)
was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
6. By a decision of 22 January 2004 the Court (First Section)
declared the application admissible.
7. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its
Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed First
Section (Rule 52 § 1).
8. Neither the applicants, nor the Government filed observations
on the merits.
THE FACTS
9. The applicants were born in 1937 and 1947 respectively and
live in Plovdiv.
10. The applicants own the first floor of a house with a yard
in Plovdiv. In May 1992 the owners of a neighbouring building started reconstructing
it without obtaining the necessary permission from the building control
authorities. The works were presented as a reconstruction of an existing
house, but it seems that in fact the old building was pulled down and replaced
by a higher and larger structure.
I. PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION
UNDER THE TERRITORIAL AND URBAN PLANNING ACT
11. In May and June 1992 the applicants filed complaints with
the mayor and the chief architect of the municipality. They alleged that
their consent for the construction had not been obtained and that the plan
of the new building did not meet the relevant legal requirements.
12. On an unspecified date the municipal authorities ordered
the suspension of the construction. The building plan was modified and
the modifications were communicated to the applicants.
13. On 7 September 1992 the applicants submitted objections
against their neighbours' request for legalisation of the construction.
14. On 19 January 1993 the municipal authorities dismissed the
applicants' objections.
15. By a decision of 18 March 1993 the construction was legalised.
16. On 14 June 1993 the applicants appealed against the 18 March
1993 legalisation decision to the Plovdiv Regional Court.
17. At the first hearing, which took place on 15 July 1993,
the applicants requested the court to constitute their neighbours as defendants,
alongside the municipality of Plovdiv. The court acceded to their request
and adjourned the case.
18. The second hearing was held on 23 August 1993. Pursuant
to a request by the applicants the court ordered a technical expert report
on the question whether the construction had been effected in compliance
with the relevant technical rules.
19. The third hearing took place on 29 December 1993. One of
the defendants stated that he had not received a copy of the applicants'
appeal and requested an adjournment. The first applicant requested a graphological
expert report to determine whether a signature appearing in the municipal
records, relating to the construction, was in fact his. The court acceded
to the parties' requests and adjourned the case.
20. The next hearing was held on 11 April 1994. The court admitted
in evidence the technical and the graphological experts' reports and questioned
the experts. The applicants' neighbours requested a new technical expert
report to be drawn up by three experts. The court agreed and adjourned
the case.
21. A hearing listed for 30 June 1994 failed to take place because
one of the defendants could not attend.
22. At the next hearing, which took place on 26 October 1994,
the three experts presented their report. Finding that they had failed
to examine certain relevant documents, the court instructed them to do
so and also asked them an additional question, as requested by the defendants.
The case was adjourned.
23. The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took
place on 25 January 1995. The court admitted the three experts' report
and certain other documents in evidence. It also heard the parties' closing
arguments and reserved judgment.
24. In a judgment of 30 June 1995 the Plovdiv Regional Court
dismissed the applicants' appeal.
25. On 24 August 1995 the applicants lodged a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
26. Noting that the applicants had not paid the requisite fee,
the court instructed them to do so. They paid the fee on 11 September 1995.
27. On unspecified dates in September and October 1995 copies
of the petition for review were served on the other parties and on 20 October
1995 the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
28. In 1997, following a restructuring of the judicial system
in Bulgaria, all administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court were transmitted to the newly established Supreme Administrative
Court.
29. A hearing listed by the Supreme Administrative Court for
3 November 1997 failed to take place because the applicants' neighbours
had not been duly summoned.
30. On 12 January 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court held
a hearing. It heard the parties' arguments and reserved judgment.
31. In a final judgment of 30 March 1998 Supreme Administrative
Court reversed the Plovdiv Regional Court's judgment and declared the 18
March 1993 legalisation decision void, as it had not been made by the competent
officer.
32. In March 1998 the construction in the neighbouring estate
had already been completed.
II. THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 109 OF THE PROPERTY ACT
33. On 28 April 1993 the applicants issued proceedings against
their neighbours at the Plovdiv District Court. They argued that the construction
in the neighbouring estate had intruded into their yard and impeded the
normal use of their house as it prevented the access of sunlight. The applicants
sought a permanent injunction under section 109 of the Property Act requiring
their neighbours to restore the situation to what it had formerly been.
34. On 11 October 1993 the Plovdiv District Court, acting pursuant
to the motion of the applicants, stayed the proceedings pending the outcome
of the proceedings under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act. In 1998,
after their completion, the proceedings between the applicants and their
neighbours resumed.
35. In a judgment of 11 January 1999 the Plovdiv District Court
dismissed the applicants' action.
36. The applicants appealed to the Plovdiv Regional Court.
37. The first hearing before that court took place on 7 June
2000. The court admitted certain documents in evidence and pursuant to
the motion of the applicants ordered an expert report to determine the
extent to which the construction in their neighbours' plot was interfering
with their property.
38. A hearing listed for 27 September 2000 did not take place
because the expert was unavailable.
39. The next hearing was held on 4 December 2000. The court
heard the expert and admitted his report in evidence. One of the defendants
requested the court to ask the expert an additional question. The court
acceded to the request over the objection of the applicants, but fined
the defendant for having failed to make it in due time.
40. A hearing took place on 1 March 2001. The court heard the
expert and admitted his additional report in evidence. One of the defendants
requested the court to ask the expert an additional question. The court
acceded to the request over the objection of the applicants and adjourned
the case.
41. The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took
place on 9 May 2001. The court heard the expert and admitted his additional
report in evidence. After hearing the parties' argument, the court reserved
judgment.
42. In a judgment of 11 August 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court
reversed the lower court's judgment and allowed the applicants' action.
43. On 18 October 2001 the applicants' neighbours appealed on
points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation.
44. A hearing was held on 12 December 2002. The court heard
the parties' argument and reserved judgment.
45. In a judgment of 16 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation
quashed the Plovdiv Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case for
a fresh examination.
46. A hearing listed by the Plovdiv Regional Court for 24 November
2003 was adjourned because one of the defendants was ill and could not
attend.
47. Another hearing, fixed for 16 February 2004, was also adjourned
because another defendant was ill and did not show up.
48. At the time of the latest information from the parties (15
March 2004) the proceedings were still pending before the Plovdiv Regional
Court. A hearing was listed for 19 April 2004.
III. PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY UNDER THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR DAMAGE ACT
49. Following the Supreme Administrative Court's holding that
the order legalising the construction of the applicants' neighbours' house
was void (see paragraph 31 above), on 11 January 1999 the applicants issued
proceedings against, inter alia, the municipality of Plovdiv,
claiming damages for the unlawful actions and omissions of the municipality
with regard to their neighbours' construction. The Plovdiv Regional Court
dismissed the applicants' action, but on appeal, in a judgment of 3 April
2002 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals allowed their claims in full, awarding
them 5,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) each, with interest as from 11 January
1999. The municipality appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court
of Cassation. However, under the relevant rule of the Code of Civil Procedure,
that judgment, although subject to appeal, was enforceable. On 20 May 2002
the applicants' lawyer requested the issuing of a writ of execution pursuant
to the judgment and on 28 May 2002 such a writ was issued. The writ was
presented to the municipality, but as of March 2004 the amount had remained
still unpaid. On 5 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the
Plovdiv Court of Appeals' judgment and remitted the case to that court.
The proceedings are still pending.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings
under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act and the proceedings for a
permanent injunction under section 109 of the Property Act had exceeded
a reasonable time. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
provides, as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone
is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Length of the proceedings under the Territorial and Urban
Planning Act
1. Period to be taken into consideration
51. Regarding the question of the beginning of the proceedings,
the Court notes that when under the national legislation an applicant has
to exhaust a preliminary administrative procedure before having recourse
to a court, the proceedings before the administrative body are to be included
when calculating the length of the civil proceedings for the purposes of
Article 6 (see Konig v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series
A no. 27, pp. 33-34, § 98, Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 304, p. 25, § 62, and Vallee
v. France, judgment of 26 April 1994, Series A no. 289?A, p.
17, § 33).
52. In the present case, prior to the court proceedings, the
applicants submitted objections against their neighbours' request for legalisation
of the construction with competent municipal authorities on 7 September
1992 (see paragraph 13 above). The Court finds that the period to be taken
into consideration started to run on that date. The proceedings ended on
30 March 1998 (see paragraph 32 above). The period to be taken into
consideration was thus five years, six months and twenty?three days, which
comprised the proceedings before the municipal authorities and two levels
of court.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
53. The Court will assess the reasonableness of the length of
the proceedings in the light of the circumstances of the case and having
regard to the criteria laid down in its case?law, in particular the complexity
of the case and the conduct of the applicants and of the relevant authorities.
What was at stake for the applicants in the litigation has also to be taken
into account (see, among many other authorities, Su?mann v. Germany,
judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996?IV,
pp. 1172?73, § 48, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96,
§ 43, ECHR 2000?VII).
54. Concerning the conduct of the authorities, the Government
argued that the proceedings before the Plovdiv Regional Court had not been
unduly delayed. All adjournments had been done in order to allow the parties
to better present their case. As regards the proceedings before the Supreme
(Administrative) Court, they had taken a longer time because that court
had just been established, following the restructuring of the judicial
system. Having regard to the high number of cases before that court, the
time taken to examine the applicants' petition for review had not been
unreasonable.
55. As regards the applicants' conduct, the Government submitted
that they had significantly contributed to the delay. In particular, the
hearings before the Plovdiv Regional Court on 15 July, 23 August and 29
December 1993 had been adjourned because of their requests to the court
to constitute their neighbours as defendants, alongside the municipality
of Plovdiv, and to order expert reports. The new defendants – the applicants'
neighbours – had caused the adjourning of the hearings on 11 April, 30
June and 26 October 1994.
56. The applicants maintained that the case was not complex
at all. In their view, the authorities had been entirely responsible for
the delay. In particular, the proceedings before the Plovdiv Regional Court
had taken more than two years and three months, which had been largely
due to that court's tolerance of the unwarranted requests of the defendants.
The proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court had taken more
than two years and five months.
57. The Court, noting in particular the grounds on which the
Supreme Administrative Court declared the 18 March 1993 legalisation decision
void (see paragraph 31 above), does not consider that the case was characterised
by any exceptional factual or legal difficulties.
58. Concerning the applicants' conduct, the Court notes that
they may be considered responsible for the adjournment of the hearing on
15 July 1993, when they requested the court to constitute new defendants
(approximately one month of delay)(see paragraph 17 above). They are also
responsible for failing to pay on time the fee for lodging a petition for
review (three weeks of delay)(see paragraph 26 above). It does not seem
that any other periods of delay are imputable to the applicants. In particular,
their requests for expert reports were not untimely and appear relevant
for the examination of the case (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). Nor can
the applicants be blamed for the procedural conduct of the defendants.
59. As to the conduct of the competent authorities, the Court
considers that the proceedings before the Plovdiv Regional Court went at
a good pace. By contrast, a lengthy gap appeared in the proceedings before
the Supreme (Administrative) Court. The applicants paid the fee for lodging
the petition for review on 11 September 1995, thus bringing their petition
into line with relevant requirements, whereas the first hearing took place
on 12 January 1998 (see paragraphs 26?30 above). The bulk of this interval
was no doubt due to the restructuring of the judicial system, but the Court,
while not disregarding the inevitable delay stemming from this reform,
notes that the States have a general obligation to organise their legal
systems so as to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6 §
1, including that of trial within a reasonable time (see Guincho v.
Portugal, judgment of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81, p. 16, § 38,
and, as a recent authority, Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99,
§ 74, 30 September 2004).
60. In conclusion, the Court considers that while the overall length of
the proceedings does not seem excessive per se, a major gap occurred
in the proceedings before the Supreme (Administrative) Court. In these
circumstances, it would be appropriate to take into account what was at
stake for the applicants (see Hadjikostova v. Bulgaria, no. 36843/97,
§ 35, 4 December 2003). Noting that the proceedings concerned the
legality of a construction which seriously interfered with the applicants'
use of their home, the Court is of the view that the authorities should
have shown more diligence in examining their case (see, as an example to
the contrary, Hadjikostova, cited above, § 36).
61. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
B. Length of the proceedings under section 109 of the Property
Act
1. Period to be taken into consideration
62. The proceedings started on 28 April 1993 (see paragraph
33 above). On 15 March 2004, date of the latest information from the parties,
they were pending before the Plovdiv Regional Court (see paragraph 48 above).
The proceedings had at that moment in time lasted ten years, ten months
and seventeen days for four levels of court.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
63. The relevant criteria for assessing the reasonableness of
the length of the proceedings have been set out in paragraph 53 above.
64. The Government did not make any submissions with regard
to these proceedings.
65. The applicants did not submit further comments.
66. The Court does not find that the case is characterised by
any exceptional legal complexity. It bore a certain degree of factual complexity,
as the courts had to establish, through expert reports, the extent to which
the construction erected by the applicants' neighbours interfered with
the peaceful enjoyment of their property. However, it does not seem that
the complexity of the case can fully explain the delays in its processing.
67. It does not appear from the information in the case?file
that the applicants were responsible for any delays.
68. Concerning the conduct of the authorities, the Court notes
that between 1993 and 1998 the proceedings were stayed to await the outcome
of the proceedings under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act, which
was apparently determinative for their outcome (see paragraph 34 above).
It is not the Court's task to determine whether there existed a sufficient
link between the two sets of proceedings and whether the proceedings at
issue were thus properly stayed, because, as a general rule, it is for
the domestic courts to establish the facts and to interpret and apply national
law. The Court will not interfere with their rulings, unless the applicants
succeed in demonstrating that they acted arbitrarily. Nor can the Court
find that a system providing for the dependence of one set of civil proceedings
on another one, when they concern the same or related facts, goes per
se against the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (see, mutatis
mutandis, Djangozov v. Bulgaria, no. 45950/99, § 38, 8 July
2004, and Todorov v. Bulgaria, no. 39832/98, § 48, 18 January
2005). However, the Court notes that after the proceedings at issue were
stayed, undue delays occurred in the concurrent proceedings (see paragraph
59 above). This, in turn, led to a delay in the proceedings at hand.
69. Later, when the proceedings resumed, a lengthy gap occurred
between 11 January 1999, when the Plovdiv District Court delivered its
judgment (see paragraph 35 above), and 7 June 2000, when the Plovdiv Regional
Court held its first hearing (see paragraph 37 above). The ensuing hearings
held by the Plovdiv Regional Court took place at regular intervals (see
paragraphs 37?41 above). However, the Court notes that on two occasions
the Plovdiv Regional Court posed additional questions to the expert, which
led to the adjourning of two hearings (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above).
This could have been avoided if the court had, from the outset, requested
the parties to formulate their questions to the expert comprehensively
and with sufficient precision. Furthermore, the Court notes that there
was a gap of more than a year before the case was set down for hearing
by the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above).
70. Finally, the Court recalls that the Plovdiv Regional Court's
judgment was quashed and that the case is still pending before the national
courts.
71. In the light of the criteria laid down in its case?law and
having regard in particular to the overall duration of the proceedings,
to what is at stake for the applicants, and to the delays attributable
to the authorities, the Court finds that the length of the proceedings
fails to satisfy the reasonable time requirement.
72. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
73. The applicants also complained that the length of the two
sets of proceedings had allowed their neighbours to finish the construction
and thus prevent the access of sunlight to the applicants' house. They
relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and
by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
74. In view of the circumstances of the case, the Court considers
it unnecessary to determine also the complaint based on Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (see Znaghi v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1991, Series
A no. 194?C, p. 47, § 23, Schreder v. Austria, no. 38536/97,
§ 24, 13 December 2001, and Kroenitz v. Poland, no. 77746/01,
§ 37, 25 February 2003).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
75. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting
Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall,
if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
76. The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each as compensation
for non-pecuniary damage. They submitted that the excessive length of the
proceedings had occasioned them anguish, which had been further intensified
by the fact that, owing to the length of the proceedings, their neighbours
had been able to finish the construction intruding in their property. Furthermore,
the second applicant alleged that she had developed a depression as a result
of the proceedings which had lasted for many years. The applicants made
detailed references to the awards of just satisfaction in a number of recent
length-of-proceedings cases.
77. Referring to the Court's practice in previous length?of?proceedings
cases against Bulgaria, the Government submitted that the claim was exaggerated
and excessive. They were of the view that the amount of the compensation
should be commensurate to the living standards in Bulgaria. They also submitted
that the length of the proceedings complained of had no causal connection
with the second applicant's state of health.
78. The Court considers that it is reasonable to assume that
the applicants have suffered distress and frustration on account of the
unreasonable length of the two sets of proceedings complained of. Taking
into account the circumstances of the case, and making its assessment on
an equitable basis, the Court awards to each of the applicants the sum
of EUR 3,500, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
79. The applicants claimed EUR 369.43 for lawyers' fees and
expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR 1,204 for lawyers'
fees and expenses incurred in the Strasbourg proceedings. They submitted
agreements between them and their lawyers outlining the lawyers' fees,
a time?sheet for the work done on the Strasbourg proceedings, postal receipts,
bank receipts for court fees and contracts for translation services. They
requested that part of the amount claimed by them for their representation
after 9 April 2001 (EUR 976) be paid directly to the lawyer they retained
on that date, Mr M. Ekimdjiev.
80. The Government submitted that they will provide to the Court
a copy of the final judgment in the proceedings under the State Responsibility
for Damage Act once it is delivered.
81. The Court notes that the lawyer's fees and the expenses
claimed with regard to the domestic proceedings concern the applicants'
representation in these proceedings. These fees and expenses do not constitute
expenses necessarily incurred in seeking redress for the violations of
the Convention found in the present case (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC],
no. 31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999?II, and E.M.K. v. Bulgaria,
no. 43231/98, § 153, 18 January 2005).
82. Concerning the amounts claimed for the Strasbourg proceedings,
having regard to all relevant factors and deducting EUR 685 received in
legal aid from the Council of Europe, the Court awards EUR 500 in respect
of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
Of this amount EUR 200 is to be paid to the applicants themselves and EUR 300
to their lawyer, Mr M. Ekimdjiev.
C. Default interest
83. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings under
the Territorial and Urban Planning Act;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings under
section 109 of the Property Act;
3. Holds that it is unnecessary to rule on the complaint
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according
to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros) in respect
of non?pecuniary damage to the first applicant and EUR 3,500 (three thousand
five hundred euros) to the second applicant;
(ii) EUR 500 (five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses,
of which EUR 200 (two hundred euros) are payable into the bank account
of the applicants and EUR 300 (three hundred euros) are payable into the
bank account of the applicants' lawyer, Mr M. Ekimdjiev, in Bulgaria;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above?mentioned three months
until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts
at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 March 2005, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Soren Nielsen
Christos Rozakis
Registrar
President
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